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1. Introduction 
The great economic crisis – the worst and longest at least since 
the post-war period, which is still holding a large part of Europe in an 
unequal grip – has a constitutional dimension that has certainly been 
overlooked, compared to other more direct and visible repercussions. In 
recent years the measures put into force by supranational institutions, 
both outside and within the traditional channels of EU law, to counteract 
the sovereign debt crisis by deeply modifying the economic governance of 
the Union, have in fact ended up questioning some of the most 
established paradigms that have historically forged – and constitutionally 
legitimised – the process of ‘integration through law’. According to the 
most credited of these paradigms, European integration should be 
conceived – particularly in its foundation – as a political project, the 
implementation of which is essentially left to economic processes 
mediated by the law. The German ‘Ordoliberal’ theorists grasped the 
meaning of this project better than others,1 identifying the constitutional 
anchorage of the newly-born European Economic Community (EEC) with 
the fundamental economic freedoms and with the system of undistorted 
competition established by the 1957 Treaty of Rome. Economic and 
monetary Union (EMU) would have had to refine this project by bringing 
it to completion; but as is well known the foundation of the whole edifice 
started to erode soon after its construction (§ 2). 
The financial and sovereign debt crisis has dramatically revealed 
the fragility of the EMU and the substantial erroneous basis of the 
constitutional premises on which it was built according to the Maastricht 
Treaty, with a fundamental decision to create a ‘currency without a 
sovereign’ (Fitoussi 2013, pp. 120 ff.).2 The response to the crisis 
pursued by the EU unsuccessfully aimed at compensating these original 
defects of construction, by introducing regulatory mechanisms which, in 
practice, have deprived national democratic institutions (primarily 
parliamentary) of their budgetary powers (at least in the debtor-States) 
constraining the residual autonomy of the Euro-zone Member States as to 
their choices regarding fiscal and social policies. The most vulnerable 
                                                 
1 The influence of German ‘Ordoliberalism’ on the European constitutional constellation has 
been masterfully (and critically) examined by Joerges 2004. More recently cf. Joerges and 
Giubboni 2013, from which this paper has taken its starting point, expanding on some of its 
arguments. 
2 That is, to institutionalise a monetary policy fully withstanding the principle of price 
stability (whose management is to be entrusted to a fully independent central bank), 
although not supported by the creation of an adequate central (federal) budget (and 
therefore of a political fiscal-union). 
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countries are now subjected to unsustainable semi-permanent austerity 
constraints, set by European level mechanisms according to an 
ideologically uniform approach (a rigid ‘one-fits-all-approach’), that 
consequently increases the powerfully divisive effects of the economic 
crisis3, at the risk of (political) disintegration. 
The new European crisis-management-law, therefore, triggers 
apparently contradictory processes that actually coalesce into a 
questioning of the original constitutional assumptions of European 
integration. On one hand (§ 3), we are witnessing a shift in the locus of 
core decisions regarding essential aspects of State policies from the 
national to the supranational level. The Treaty on Stability, Coordination 
and Governance of the economic and monetary Union (an unprecedented 
example of Ersatzunionrecht4) has firmly placed at its core the new 
‘golden rule’ of a balanced-budget. On the other hand (§ 4), the very 
same process of ‘dethroning politics’5  has been entrusted to governance-
mechanisms – broadly defined outside the perimeter of the classic 
Community-method and even of EU law –, which hand over decisions to 
be taken by opaque and unaccountable technocratic élites and which, by 
definition, evade the traditional constraints of Community rule of law by 
putting it beyond the reach for an effective judicial review. 
A double (and only apparently contradictory) process of de-
politicisation and de-legalisation is therefore taking place within a new EU 
constitutional setting. The technocratic acquisition of fundamental 
political decisions, which in the European constitutional model was 
reserved to national democratic processes, especially with reference to 
policies affecting the Welfare State systems (Giubboni 2006 and 2012), 
takes place within an institutional framework that has moved away from 
the classic realm of the EU rule of law. The formula coined by Habermas 
(2011) of a ‘post-democratic executive federalism’ effectively depicts this 
dual dimension of the new European crisis-management-law. The 
                                                 
3 The crisis has re-emphasized the already large economic disparities, especially within the 
Euro-zone, mainly burdening the debtor countries and advantaging the creditors and 
Germany in particular (e.g. see Quadrio Curzio 2014). Indeed, it has resulted in a massive 
redistribution of wealth, but in an exact reverse sense to the one accredited by the clichés 
of the austerity supporters, given that the flow of such transfer clearly goes from the 
Southern countries to the Northern ones. Hence, as effectively observed, a transfer-Union 
has actually operated in these years in the Euro-zone: ‘though contrariwise, and the 
Northern countries are the main beneficiaries’ (Fitoussi 2013, p. 123). 
4 That is, an international-intergovernmental surrogate of EU law, according to the 
figurative expression used by the German Constitutional Court, although in a different 
context, in its decision of 7 September 2011 on the measures of financial assistance to 
Greece (2 BvR 987/10 – 2 BvR 1485/10, 2 BvR 1099/10). 
5 As Supiot 2010, p. 33, wrote evoking the famous Hayekian expression. 
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category of ‘authoritarian managerialism’ evoked by Joerges6 is even 
more tranchante in denouncing the non-democratic traits (and the 
Schmittian ascendancy) of the new European economic governance. But 
regardless of the redolant power that these expressions or other similar 
ones have,7 what we want to highlight here is the emergence of a new 
phenomenon that we might explain as a constitutional paradigm-change 
underlying the new European economic governance, which goes beyond 
the seeming emergency requirements of the austerity policies of fiscal 
consolidation conducted in recent years. In this new framework, the 
original ‘Ordoliberal’ normative ideal of a formal constitutional order of 
the European economy is disregarded at the very moment in which the 
ineffective answers given to the economic-financial crisis through the 
‘neo-monetarist medieval medicine of austerity’ (Countouris and 
Freedland 2013a, p. 5) contribute to undermine  the very democratic 
legitimacy of the Union, openly questioning the constitutional embedding 
of the several Sozial-Staat democratic traditions on which, in the mid-
fifties, the Communities were originally rooted. 
The crisis of the so-called ‘European social model’ has 
constitutional roots in the new economic governance of the Union: a 
constitutional dimension which is worth exploring in more depth before 
attempting to set out some concluding remarks on the uncertain 
prospects of the Welfare State in Europe (§ 5). 
2. ‘Integration through law’ and its crisis 
The term ‘Community of law’, which has been adopted over a long 
period by the case law of the Court of Justice, owes its success to the first 
president of the European Commission (Hallstein 1969). In a Community 
based on law, it represents, at one and the same time, ‘the object and 
the agent’8 of the integration process. Since the very beginning of this 
process there was, without doubt, a decisive reliance on law and on its 
resources, especially for the building of the common market: the 
founding stone of the entire Community project. 
The celebrated formula of ‘integration through law’, established in 
the 1980s as a successful motto due to the seminal work of the most 
                                                 
6 Cf. Joerges 2012. The similarity with the term ‘authoritarian liberalism’, coined by Heller 
(1933) in the midst of the Weimar crisis is evident – and sought after. Also in similar terms 
cf. Wilkinson 2013, p. 548 (‘executive emergency constitutionalism’). 
7 See now Streeck 2013, p. 119 ff., speaking of technocratic neutralization of politics and of 
a new fiscal-consolidation-State in Europe. 
8 Dehousse and Weiler 1990, p. 243. 
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influential scholars on the European scene9, has represented the most 
proficient and advanced attempt to rationalise the whole European 
project, as it synthesised (better than through any other 
conceptualisation) the specific balance between law, politics and economy 
– on which the whole integration process was built in its founding stage. 
The constitutionalisation of the Treaties – carried out by the Court of 
Justice through the inventio of a new type of autonomous legal order, 
distinct both from the law of the Member States and from international 
law – was a key concept within this paradigm. 
Nevertheless, on the long path that travelled from the Community 
of 1957 towards an ever closer union among its people, Europe has 
continuously renewed what Ipsen (1987) called its Wandelverfassung. 
And along this path, some of the main tenets of the ‘integration through 
law’ paradigm have been progressively weakened and eroded. The actual 
integrity of those principles is now being challenged, as never before, by 
the Union’s ‘existential crisis’ (Menéndez 2013). Upon a closer inspection, 
we might assume that even the original plan for a monetary union, as 
had been envisioned under the Maastricht Treaty, appears to be 
incompatible with the fundamental principles of the role of law within the 
European integration process, as conceived under that model. 
Monetary union was not conceived as a political union; on the 
contrary, it was bound to a rigid system of supranational legal rules which 
were aimed at compensating for the void of political budgetary solidarity 
among the Member States. Monetary policy was thus entirely subjected 
to the European constitutional rules and, at the same time, almost 
entirely isolated from the political process. And this could fit the 
normative requirements of an ‘Ordoliberal’ European economic 
constitution. However, from the outset, this construction reveals a crucial 
difference compared to the classic paradigm of ‘integration through law’. 
The essential difference, with respect to the function assigned to law in 
the European integration process, is that, in that conceptualisation, 
supranational law and intergovernmental policy-making must maintain a 
balance. The ‘dual character’ (Weiler 1981) of the Community system in 
that model implies a necessary dynamic equilibrium between law and 
politics in the European integration process. Supranational law neither 
should nor could have entirely replaced the intergovernmental political 
process, given that, in such a theoretical framework, the overall balance 
                                                 
9 It is an obvious reference to the seminal reconstruction by Weiler 1981, followed by the 
no-less fundamental collective research directed by Cappelletti, Seccombe and Weiler 1986 
(et seq.) at the European University Institute at Florence. 
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of the Community system depends on the mechanisms of adaptation and 
mutual balancing among the two subsystems. 
The monetary union conceived by the Maastricht Treaty, instead, 
disrupts this balance. Beneath the dominant function assigned to law in 
the implementation of this political project we can in fact retrace the 
legacy of another categorisation of the Community system, the one 
attributable to the German ‘Ordoliberal’ tradition, much more demanding 
and prescriptive regarding the functions of European economic law. The 
EMU’s constitutional architecture was actually meant to comply with these 
prescriptions by giving the EMU a configuration capable of immunising it 
once and for all from possible Keynesian distortions in the European 
macro-economic management. Nevertheless, the reforms of the 
economic and monetary governance of the EMU, introduced as of 2010 
onwards in an attempt to mitigate the effects of the financial crisis which 
had spread to the sovereign debts of the Member States of the Euro-
zone’s periphery, have come to sever the ties also within this normative 
tradition, when Europe’s new crisis-law entered the unexplored 
constitutional territories of ‘post-democratic executive federalism’ 
(Habermas 2011). 
3. De-politicisation, loss of neutrality of the European 
economic constitution and de-socialisation processes 
Evidently, the European economic and monetary Union – as it was 
devised in Maastricht – was not able to cope with the devastating effects 
produced by the financial crisis: it had been founded on assumptions that 
did not contemplate such a systemic crisis and, more importantly, it did 
not have the tools to manage it (cf. e.g. Fitoussi 2013). That is why, at 
the beginning of 2010 the reaction to the crisis had begun in an unusually 
rapid way with respect to the usual slow pace of the Community decision-
making process, although nevertheless with a fatal delay compared to 
what would have been necessary to ease the tensions originating from 
the unruly financial markets. This was carried out with unprecedented 
and ever more inventive regulatory techniques that became necessary 
and urgent – or at least were justified as such – due to the concrete risk 
of the imminent tightening of the crisis with the possible breakdown of 
the Euro-zone. 
A quick chronology of events can remind us of the hectic pace  
eventually taken by the emergency measures adopted by the Union: 
‘Europe 2020’ strategy (March 2010); European semester (May 2010); 
framework agreement on the establishment of a European stability fund 
(June 2010); Euro-Plus Pact (March 2011); Six Pack (December 2011);  
Two Pack (proposed by the European Commission on November 2011 
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and adopted with Regulations n° 472 and 473 of 2013); European 
Stability Mechanism (February 2012); Fiscal Compact (March 2012). The 
cornerstone of this complex weaving of emergency tools is the Fiscal 
Compact, which introduces the previously evoked clause of the public 
debt-brake, modelled on the German constitutional experience, 
compliance to which is eventually left to a sort of extra-ordinem 
supervision of the Court of Justice as it is designed outside its ordinary 
jurisdictional competence under EU law (cf. Seifert 2014, p. 313 ff.). 
Access to financial support given by the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM) is only permitted to those Member States of the Euro-zone that 
have signed the Fiscal Compact and have therefore transposed into 
national law – preferably at constitutional level – the golden rule of 
balanced budgets. 
At the same time, in order to provide a less questionable legal 
basis than the one outlined by the Treaties at the time of the negotiation 
of these tools, the simplified revision procedure, introduced by the Lisbon 
Treaty, was activated, as provided for in Art. 48, paragraph 6 of the TEU, 
with the addition of a new paragraph 3 to Art. 136 of the TFEU that 
permits – as of 2013 – the establishment of (conditional) mechanisms of 
financial emergency, similar to the ones that have already been 
implemented. From a strictly technical-legal standpoint, these measures 
offer a wide range of reasons and themes for debate, and not surprisingly 
the debates on the limits of action guaranteed to the Union by the 
Treaties, especially prior to the amendment of Art. 136 of the TFEU, are 
still ongoing, and among many legal scholars there has been a growing 
criticism and a questioning of the overall legality of this creative 
institutional infrastructure (see especially Guarino 2012). However, the 
true issue here is not so much the occurrence of more or less creative 
interpretations of the text of the Treaties, as much as the deep 
constitutional change that has taken place around these reforms, so that 
the legal paths determined by the classic canons of the Community rule 
of law are, to an ever greater extent, being superseded by discretionary 
measures marked by contingency and conditionality that are entrusted to 
the discretionary governance of a distant multilateral administration. 
These measures revolve around some sort of new-fangled supranational 
functional administration, apparently fashioned on the model of 
independent agencies, but intended to take action in areas that fall 
outside the sphere of the formal competences of the Union and 
characterized by a wide-ranging political discretion.  
However, before addressing this issue, it is necessary to focus to a 
greater extent on the other side of the coin of this constitutional 
transformation realised by the new European crisis-management-law. 
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Considered together, these measures assault the Euro-zone with binding 
detailed rules aimed at limiting and – more or less strictly – conditioning 
the sphere of macroeconomic discretion left to the Member States. As has 
been observed in practice, the reason why ‘the Euro-zone is governed by 
rules is that few of its Member-States – least of all its wealthier North 
European ones – have any appetite for fiscal union. Crudely, rules 
(governance) exist because common fiscal institutions (government) do 
not. And tighter rules do not amount to greater fiscal integration. The 
hallmark of fiscal integration is mutualisation – a greater pooling of 
budgetary resources, joint debt assistance, a common backstop to the 
banking system, and so on. Tighter rules are not so much a path to 
mutualisation, as an attempt to prevent it from happening’.10 
This massive juridification, resulting from the appropriation by the 
new European crisis-law of the (already heavily constricted) sphere of 
discretion of macro-economic governance by Member States in the Euro-
zone, occurs in the context of an attempt to the technical neutralization 
of the political decisions regarding very delicate redistribution-issues – 
now placed precisely inside the sharp-eyed mechanisms for  surveillance 
and punishment of the economic governance of the Union (Chalmers 
2012) –, which is clearly anything but neutral in its consequences. The 
pervasive juridification of decisive aspects of macroeconomic governance, 
along with the juxtaposition of rules and sanctions to ‘intelligent 
discretion’ (Salvati 2013, p. 567), which national governments were 
previously permitted to apply (at least partially) has resulted in a 
permanent loss of neutrality for the economic constitution of the EMU.11 
This results in the incorporation of neo-monetarist precepts into European 
higher law, causing highly asymmetrical impacts on the very different 
economies of the Euro-zone’s countries. Rules of this kind, in fact, not 
only refute the prospects of a greater fiscal integration and of a political 
solidarity on occasion (and futilely) evoked in these past years, but they 
actually establish a regime from which the ‘virtuous’ and wealthier 
Northern countries, led by Germany (Beck 2013), systematically benefit 
compared to the Southern ones, especially when – as in Italy – these 
bear the historical burden of high public debt. 
Although in a highly asymmetrical way and depending on the 
starting point of the Member States of the Euro-zone, the 
                                                 
10 Tilford and White 2011, p. 2. 
11 On the matter cf. Countouris and Freedland 2013a, p. 6, who emphasise how ‘the 
monetarist dogma of fiscal austerity is being institutionalised and entrenched in the 
European constitutional framework with provisions such as the Euro Plus Pact and the new 
Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the EMU’. 
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‘constitutionalisation of austerity’ (De Witte 2013) deriving from the new 
European crisis-law, and particularly form the Fiscal Compact, has deep 
and in some cases direct implications for national Welfare State systems. 
In fact, it establishes a sort of permanent constitutional pressure towards 
a flexible (i.e., de-regulated) labour market (both in terms of fostering 
the use of non-standard types of employment and reducing protection in 
the event of dismissal, especially with regard to economic lay-offs), a 
decentralised collective bargaining system (specifically encouraged by the 
Euro Plus Pact) and consequently a downgrading of the overall weight 
and role granted to public social security and in particular State pension 
systems (see Deakin and Koukiadaki 2013). Such a constitutional 
grounding of the most ideal-typical neo-liberal political and economic 
doctrines (Crouch 2013) installs the logic of permanent competition 
within the system between the several national social models, creating a 
situation in which the Member States of the Euro-zone are urged to 
manage their disparities and gain efficiency and competitiveness by 
basically utilising the only leverage remaining, which is, broadly  
speaking, the ‘structural reform’ of their own welfare systems.  
 Naturally I am aware that this sketchy and stylised description of 
the new neo-liberal economic constitution of the EMU deliberately 
emphasises a singular determinism that in the real world is hopelessly 
lacking. The reality is obviously much more complex and intricate, and 
the mechanisms of resilience variously activated by the several national 
systems – especially by the industrial relations sub-systems – show how 
the legislative responses given by the Member States do not follow a logic 
of linear and deterministic de-structuring of those widespread and deep-
rooted social and labour protection arrangements that we usually 
encapsulate in the – increasingly less evocative – formula of the 
‘European social model’ (cf. Treu 2013 and Carrieri and Treu 2013). 
However, we cannot deny the presence of very strong forces towards a 
de-regulative competition (in the sense of a ‘race to the bottom’12) 
between systems of labour law and social security in the Member States 
(not only) in the Euro-zone and the occurrence of a significant 
acceleration in what Baccaro and Howell (2013) called the convergence 
towards a common ‘neo-liberal trajectory’ of the collective bargaining 
systems. 
 
 
                                                 
12 Deakin and Koukiadaki 2013, p. 163. See also Marshall 2014. 
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4. De-legalisation of the economic and monetary 
governance of the Union 
As already mentioned, the constitutional direction given to the 
Union by the new European crisis-law is not even compatible with the 
classical precepts of German ‘Ordoliberalism’, fundamentally because it 
extends the sphere of the European economic constitution to areas that 
we may define as ontologically imbued with a concentrated dose of 
political discretion and therefore not likely to be reducible to immediately 
definable and legally predetermined rules of action that are capable of 
being ‘subjected to constraints by constitutional rules based on justiciable 
criteria’ (Mestmäcker 1972, p. 97). In the ‘Ordoliberal’ constitutional 
ideal, those rules may (and in fact must) be confined to the sphere of the 
formal-rational prerequisites for the functioning of the common market 
(including the institutionalization of the fundamental economic freedoms, 
of undistorted competition and of the principle of monetary stability 
entrusted to the technocratic government of an independent central bank 
that is isolated from political pressure), but they cannot go as far as to 
touch the sphere of macroeconomic policies that presuppose contingent 
and discretionary decisions. This sphere must remain a prerogative of 
national governments and their parliaments, as it has not been possible 
to remove them from democratic political debate. 
For this same reason, in the original constitutional framework of 
the Treaties establishing the European Community, and fully consistent in 
this regard with the requirements of ‘Ordoliberalism’, social policy was to 
remain assigned to national democratic sovereignty, in particular so as to 
ensure the necessary respect for the private-collective autonomy of trade 
unions. The underlying reason for this choice of maintaining a distinct 
functional separation (the ‘de-coupling’ according to Scharpf 2010, p. 
221) between the building of the common market, within the remit of the 
Community economic constitution, and the sphere of social policies, a 
prerogative of national democratic political and social processes, 
evidently lies in the fact that the latter belong to the realm of 
discretionary-politics. 
None of this can be observed in the complex regulatory machine of 
the new European economic governance which, on the contrary, can 
claim to be intruding deeply into the sphere of the discretionary politics of 
the Member States, typifying notions that are characterized – beyond the 
effort of introducing ‘objective’ numerical parameters13 – by a compelling 
ambiguity and a great elasticity (we can just think of concepts such those 
                                                 
13 See the fine deconstructive critique by Jubé 2011. 
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of serious or excessive macroeconomic imbalance). In such a context, the 
role of judicial review, entrusted by EU law (Article 263 of the TFEU) to 
the Court of Justice, becomes so crucial in theory but unfeasible in 
practice. Firstly, it is not very likely that those defined as the interested 
parties by paragraph 2 of that provision– namely the Member States, the 
Council, and the Commission – might effectively question those measures 
in which they themselves are so deeply involved, especially in the 
likelihood of an economic-financial crisis such as the current one, and 
that the Court may, then, effectively exercise its review functions. But, 
perhaps, what is most important is the fact that the Court would find 
itself adjudicating quintessentially political issues and consequential 
decisions made in light of elastic and indeterminate notions which cannot 
be scrutinised, as such, within the parameters of a properly defined 
judicial review. The two very well-known disputes on the ESM so far 
deliberated upon before the German Constitutional Court14 and the Court 
of Justice15 have visibly demonstrated the essentially untreatable nature 
of these issues before the courts, revealing that the European economic 
constitution is dangerously lacking in a ‘guardian’16 (Everson and Joerges 
2013; Joerges and Giubboni 2013). 
On the other hand, the answers given by the Court of Justice 
within preliminary-ruling-proceedings by which some judges of the 
debtor-States of the Euro-zone have raised questions of the compatibility 
of the austerity measures adopted by their national governments in 
implementing supranational commitments with the Troika with the EU 
Charter of fundamental rights have to date at best been elusive. So far, 
the Court has rather easily and hastily managed to declare that it does 
not have jurisdiction to rule on such matters,17 thus avoiding, thanks to a 
decision on inadmissibility, a review on the merit of the (obviously 
                                                 
14 Bundesverfassungsgericht, decision of 12 September 2012 and ruling of 18 March 2014. 
15 Court of Justice of the European Union, 27 November 2012, case C-370/12, Thomas 
Pringle v. Ireland. 
16 Moreover, the methodological nationalism of the German Constitutional Court prevents it 
from being a guardian of the European constitution and particularly a guarantor for what 
Rödl (2008) may call the interdependence of labour constitutions of the Member States. The 
Court of Karlsruhe – beyond the commitments towards a ‘European openness’ – may 
actually play an effective role only in the protection of the German social and democratic 
constitution (Art. 20 and 79 of the Grundgesetz). A clear evidence of this is the German 
Constitutional Court’s preliminary reference to the Court of Justice on 14 January 2014 on 
the OMT (Outright Monetary Transactions) programme enacted by the BCE. See BVerfG, 2 
BvR 2728/13 of 14.1.2014. 
17 The best known of these preliminary rulings is the one decided by the Court of Justice in 
case C-128/12, Sindicato dos Bancários do Norte et al., For a complete listing of these cases 
and for a careful recognition of the limits of the Court's case law, cf. Barnard 2013. 
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problematic) relations between these measures of fiscal consolidation and 
the fundamental principles of European social law, as enshrined in the 
Charter of Nice/Strasbourg. We do not know the extent to which the 
Court will maintain this elusive strategy (depending for the most on how 
the preliminary reference will be formulated); nonetheless, we are not 
confident that the Luxembourg judges will actually be able to consider the 
merits of these untreatable political issues reaffirming the constitutional 
logic of fundamental social rights.  
On the whole, this case law demonstrates a fairly accurate picture 
of the new European constitutional constellation in times of crisis. The 
philosophy of the prohibition of bail-out, along with its appeal to Member 
States’ autonomy and responsibility, is replaced by a new system of 
collective governance in situations of crisis. However, the law delegates 
the management of these situations to an unaccountable supranational 
technocratic authority, without worrying about the problems of 
democratic legitimacy arising from the new decision-making processes, 
especially those that take place within the ESM. This generates an 
apparent contradiction: on one hand, the new crisis-management-law 
over-regulates European economic governance in order to tighten the 
macroeconomic and fiscal conduct of the Member States within a dense 
texture of rules, assisted by a strong semi-automatic supranational 
sanctioning system. On the other hand, we are witnessing a creeping de-
legalisation, in so far as the key concepts of the new governance – 
starting with notions like excessive deficit or serious imbalance – create 
the space for discretionary political evaluations made by the post-
democratic technocratic bodies in charge of their implementation.18 The 
first facet is only apparently in line with the ‘Ordoliberal’ requirements of 
an economic policy that is bound by legal rules. In contrast, the second is 
openly in contradiction with such a normative ideal-type in that it recalls 
the Schmittian propensity to replace law with the sheer, unrestrained 
governmental political-discretionary decision.19 
5. The uncertain scenarios of the Welfare State in 
Europe 
The European crisis-law has thus deeply modified the economic 
constitution of the EMU. At the same time it is evident that the crisis of 
the European social model has itself a precise constitutional dimension in 
this new context. The link between these aspects is very evident: the 
                                                 
18 Cf. Joerges 2008. 
19 Again cf. Joerges 2012. 
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impact caused by the measures adopted by the Member States of the 
Union, and especially of the Euro-zone, over national systems of labour 
law and social security, for the implementation of policies that are more 
or less directly attributable to the pervasive deployment of the new 
economic governance of the crisis, already offers plentiful confirmation of 
this tight relationship.20 Nor is it a coincidence that the ambitious agenda 
for re-socialising Europe, suggested by the eminent group of European 
intellectuals gathered in London by Nicola Countouris and Mark Freedland 
(2013b), pleads for a substantial inversion of the constitutional trajectory 
imprinted on the Union by the new management-crisis-law. 
These proposals for re-socialising Europe contain indeed a very 
detailed and path-breaking programme for reforms (also cf. Supiot 2013) 
and there is not the space in this paper to give appropriate attention to 
their technical-legal aspects. In line with the general and critical analysis 
carried out so far, we would rather like to suggest a more modest 
attempt to set out the possible scenarios for the Welfare State in Europe, 
in the light of models of economic and social constitution that are 
available or may be simply foreshadowed (or desirable). 
The scenario that Deakin and Koukiadaki (2013, p. 186) effectively 
define of ‘regulated austerity’ is the mere projection of the existing one, 
with some timid tempering of the harshness of austerity/conditionality 
policies constitutionalised by the ‘Stability Compact’, for example through 
the flanking of (moderate) policies for growth and employment, a bit 
more effective than those foreshadowed by the anaemic ‘Growth 
Compact’.21  This scenario would essentially confirm the current trends 
towards de-regulative competition and internal devaluation through a 
(further) flexibilisation of labour markets and the reduction of wage levels 
by means of the marginalisation of the role of (especially national) 
collective bargaining. In this kind of scenario, any encouragement of 
practices of social dialogue, even at European level, would constitute 
hardly more than a ‘travesty of the real thing’ (Carrieri and Treu 2013, p. 
24), as its value would essentially be functional to the strengthening of 
                                                 
20 The Memoranda of understanding negotiated with the Troika by the countries that made 
recourse (to varying degrees and in different ways) to European financial aid (Ireland, 
Greece and Portugal) all provide for obligations for radial reforms of the national labour law 
and social security systems according to a ‘crude, unreconstructed neo-liberalism’ (Crouch 
2013, p. 41). Spain and Italy offer examples of more indirect, but not less relevant, impact 
of such politics of austerity cum conditionality. Cf. Deakin, Koukiadaki 2013 and 
Costamagna 2012; for Italy, Giubboni, Lo Faro 2013 and Jessoula 2012. 
21 On the total inconsistency of the so called Growth Compact emphatically launched by the 
European council of 28-29 June 2012, but actually remained unaccomplished, see Treu 
2013, p. 610. 
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the strategies of ‘competitive solidarity’ among national systems22 
(Streeck 1999 and 2013, pp. 138 and 209 ff.). 
Not even the scenario of a ‘two-speed Europe’ as defined by the 
same authors – with a division of the Euro-zone in a core group of 
virtuous Northern European countries led by Germany and a Southern 
periphery of weak economies, which are intended to go along the 
downside routes of competitiveness, based on the systematic 
compression of labour costs – evidently gives rise to optimistic outlooks 
on the possible dynamics of the Welfare State in the new European 
constitutional framework. A very different scenario is the one that Deakin 
and Koukiadaki (2013, p. 187) term as ‘solidaristic integration’, to which 
the two authors attribute (along with their explicit normative preference) 
a degree of probability that is more or less equivalent to the one defined 
as ‘regulated austerity’. Therefore, attention must be drawn to this 
scenario, in order to outline a possible strategy of the re-
constitutionalisation of social Europe that follows a path that is the 
opposite of the (de-legalised and de-socialised) one enshrined in the new 
economic governance of the EMU. 
Deakin and Koukiadaki (2013, p. 187) suggest three convergent 
routes for such a re-socialisation, based respectively: a) on the expansion 
of the European central-budget in order to perform tasks of fiscal-transfer 
re-directed in favour of peripheral countries and actually adjusted to 
meet their needs (thus accessible beyond the suffocating conditionality 
requirements contemplated today by the ESM); b) on replacing the 
regime-competition among national labour law systems with new social 
harmonisation policies (or rather, more likely, with the fixing a minimum 
floor of social and labour standards);23 c) on the rethinking of the role of 
the ECB, with the assignment of a broader mandate that explicitly takes 
into account (and therefore systematically balances) price stability, 
employment growth and social cohesion. 
‘Vaste programme’ – one might say –, in relation to which it is 
hard to foresee who might be the social and political actors (the ‘material 
forces’, to use an old-fashioned expression) that can operate with realistic 
prospects of (even just partial) success.24 However, the merit of this 
proposal is to clearly put into evidence how an effective prospect of the 
Union’s re-socialisation implies, on one hand, a greater political 
investment in the new ‘European social question’ (De Witte 2013), and on 
the other, a constitutional reform of the Union. We could say it implies a 
                                                 
22 The ‘competition trap’ that Gallino (2012, p. 81) refers to. 
23 Cf.  Giubboni 2013, chap. I and II. 
24 A less ambitious perspective was outlined in Joerges and Giubboni 2013.  
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re-politicisation and a re-constitutionalisation of the social question on a 
European and transnational scale at the same time. 
Defensive responses at national level – basically a return to the 
original division of labour between the Union and the Member States that 
returns national welfare policies to the narrow boundaries of national 
social sovereignty – appear simply illusory. Certainly, this does not mean 
that there is no need to restore a greater margin of autonomy into the 
hands of the Member States for the determination of their social and 
labour policies.25 However, in order to do so, it is necessary to re-
construct a European social policy, both by establishing minimum 
protection standards, which would channel regulatory competition among 
the national legal systems above a common floor of rights, and also by 
strengthening transnational social solidarity ties, for example through 
auxiliary legislation aimed at fostering and coordinating autonomous 
collective bargaining processes at European level (cf. Carrieri and Treu 
2013, pp. 33 ff.). 
Time will show how much of this scenario is wishful-thinking or if it 
has even a minimal possibility of being pursued in a future European 
political agenda. 
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